We further the study of order-preserving symmetric encryption (OPE), a primitive for allowing efficient range queries on encrypted data, recently initiated (from a cryptographic perspective) by Boldyreva et al. (Eurocrypt '09). First, we address the open problem of characterizing what encryption via a random order-preserving function (ROPF) leaks about underlying data (ROPF being the "ideal object" in the security definition, POPF, satisfied by their scheme.) In particular, we show that, for a database of randomly distributed plaintexts and appropriate choice of parameters, ROPF encryption leaks neither the precise value of any plaintext nor the precise distance between any two of them. The analysis here introduces useful new techniques. On the other hand, we show that ROPF encryption leaks approximate value of any plaintext as well as approximate distance between any two plaintexts, each to an accuracy of about square root of the domain size. We then study schemes that are not order-preserving, but which nevertheless allow efficient range queries and achieve security notions stronger than POPF. In a setting where the entire database is known in advance of key-generation (considered in several prior works), we show that recent constructions of "monotone minimal perfect hash functions" allow to efficiently achieve (an adaptation of) the notion of IND-O(rdered) CPA also considered by Boldyreva et al., which asks that only the order relations among the plaintexts is leaked. Finally, we introduce modular order-preserving encryption (MOPE), in which the scheme of Boldyreva et al. is prepended with a random shift cipher. MOPE improves the security of OPE in a sense, as it does not leak any information about plaintext location. We clarify that our work should not be interpreted as saying the original scheme of Boldyreva et al., or the variants that we introduce, are "secure" or "insecure." Rather, the goal of this line of research is to help practitioners decide whether the options provide a suitable security-functionality tradeoff for a given application.
Introduction
Background and motivation. An order-preserving symmetric encryption (or OPE) scheme is a deterministic symmetric encryption scheme whose encryption algorithm produces ciphertexts that preserve numerical ordering of the plaintexts. OPE was proposed in the database community by Agrawal et al. [1] in 2004 as a tool to support efficient range queries on encrypted data. (When encryption is done using an OPE scheme, a range query simply consists of the encryptions of the two end-points.) However, the first formal cryptographic treatment of OPE did not appear until recently, in the paper by Boldyreva et al. [8] . The authors formalized a security requirement for OPE and proposed an efficient blockcipher-based scheme provably meeting their security definition.
Yet despite having an OPE scheme that provably satisfies their security notion, the authors warn against its practical use before further studies of its security are performed. To explain this, consider the security notion from [8] , called pseudorandom order-preserving function security under chosen-ciphertext attacks (POPF-CCA).
The POPF-CCA notion (hereafter shortened to POPF) calls an OPE scheme secure if oracle access to its encryption algorithm is indistinguishable from oracle access to a random order-preserving function (ROPF) on the same domain and range. An ROPF is thus the "ideal object" in the POPF definition, analogous to the way that a random function is the ideal object in the classical security notion of pseudorandom function (PRF). However, the ideal objects here, an ROPF and a random function, have fundamentally different security properties. A random function's behavior is well understood: on a new input the output is a uniformly random point in the range, independent of other outputs. Hence, an adversary seeing a function value learns absolutely no information about the pre-image, unless the former happens to coincide with one it has previously seen. But the situation with a random OPF is much harder to describe. It is clear that a random OPF cannot provide such strong security, but what exactly is leaked about the data and what is protected? The distribution of ciphertexts is known and it is not immediately clear if encryption is even one-way.
Despite its authors' warning of lingering unanswered questions, the OPE scheme from [8] immediately received attention from the applied community [3, 21, 18, 17, 14, 19] . We agree that a secure OPE is better than no encryption at all and understand why the idea of its implementation may sound appealing. But practical use without a clear security understanding can be very dangerous and thus it is very important to clarify the security questions as soon as possible.
In this work we first address this open problem. We revisit the security of the ideal object, an ROPF, and provide results that help characterize what it leaks and what it protects about the underlying data. In addition, we observe that it may be possible to achieve stronger security notions than POPF using schemes that fall outside the OPE class but nevertheless allow efficient range queries on encrypted data, and propose two such schemes. We now discuss our contributions in more detail.
New definitions for studying ROPF security. As pointed out by [8] , a random orderpreserving function-the ideal object in the POPF definition from that paper-itself (perhaps surprisingly) requires a cryptographic treatment.
In order to better understand the strengths and limitations of encryption with an ROPF we first propose several security notions. One captures a basic one-wayness security and measures the probability that an adversary, given a set of ciphertexts of random messages, decrypts one of them. (The fact that messages are chosen uniformly at random we call the "uniformity assumption," and it will be discussed later.) We give the adversary multiple challenge ciphertexts because this corresponds to practical settings and because the ciphertexts are not independent from each other: learning more points of the OPE function may give the adversary additional information. We actually consider a more general security notion that asks the adversary, given a set of ciphertexts of random messages, to guess an interval (window) within which the underlying challenge plaintext lies. This definition helps us get a better sense of how accurately the adversary can identify the location of a data point. The size of the window and the number of challenge ciphertexts are parameters of the definition. When the window size is one, the notion collapses to the case of simple one-wayness.
Our subsequent definitions address leakage of information not about the location of the data points but rather the distances between them, which seems crucial in other applications (e.g., a database of salaries). Indeed, [8] showed that on a practically-sized ciphertext space, an ROPF, like any OPE, must leak some information relating to distances between plaintexts. We attempt to clarify this intuition. We consider a definition measuring the adversary's success in (precisely) guessing the distance 1 between the plaintexts corresponding to any two out of the set of ciphertexts of random messages given to the adversary. Again, we also consider a more general definition where the adversary is allowed to specify a window in which the distance falls.
We analyze security of an ROPF under these definitions as we believe this helps to understand secure pseudorandom OPE schemes' security guarantees and limitations, and also to evaluate the risk of their usage in various applications. (Indeed, we believe they capture the information about data, namely location and relative distances, that real-world practitioners are most likely to care about.) However, especially in light of the uniformity assumption (which is unlikely to be satisfied in practice), while we view our results as providing important steps in the direction of this understanding (as even under this assumption our results are challenging to prove), we still advise against practical use of OPE unless a practitioner is fully aware, and accepting, of what has and has not been provably shown about its security.
Analysis of an ROPF. We first give an upper bound on the one-wayness advantage of any adversary attacking an ROPF. The proof is quite involved (and is explained in detail in the Appendix), but the result is a very concise, understandable bound that, under reasonable assumptions, does not even depend on the size of the ciphertext space. (Intuitively, an ROPF's one-wayness comes from the function's probability of deviating from points on the linear OPF m → (N/M )m. Increasing the ciphertext space size beyond a certain amount has little to no effect on these deviations.) We evaluate the bound for several parameters to get an idea of its quality. Our evaluation demonstrates that on practical parameters ROPF and POPF-secure OPEs significantly resist one-wayness attacks, i.e. the maximum one-wayness advantage of any adversary is quite low.
On the other hand, our ROPF analysis under the window one-wayness definition shows that a very efficient adversary can successfully break window one-wayness if the size of the window is not very small. In particular, for message space size M and arbitrary constant b, if the window size is approximately b √ M , there exists an adversary A whose window one-wayness advantage is at least 1 − 2e −b 2 /2 . Thus, for b large enough (say, b ≥ 8), there exists an adversary with window one-wayness advantage very close to one.
We then extend our analysis of an ROPF to the distance one-wayness and window distance one-wayness definitions. Using similar techniques we show entirely analogous results, namely that the former is very small but the latter becomes large when the adversary is allowed to specify a window of size approximately b √ M . We conclude our ROPF analysis with several important supplemental remarks regarding the effect of known-plaintext attacks in the schemes, choosing an appropriate ciphertext space size, and the need to satisfy the uniformity assumption in practical implementations.
Achieving stronger security. We next consider the question of whether different types of schemes that support efficient range queries can achieve stronger security than POPF. To capture such schemes we introduce a general notion of efficiently orderable encryption (EOE), that covers all schemes supporting standard range queries by requiring a publicly computable function that determines order of the underlying plaintexts given any two ciphertexts. Since EOE leaks order of ciphertexts, the indistinguishability under ordered chosen plaintext attacks (IND-OCPA) definition, which [8] introduced and showed is unachievable by OPE, is an ideal level of security for EOE schemes.
An optimally secure committed EOE scheme. We focus on a scenario where we can show something like IND-OCPA security is possible. We define "committed" versions of EOE and IND-OCPA, called CEOE and IND-CCPA, corresponding to a setting where the database is static and completely known to the user in advance of encryption. Such a scenario is apparently important as it was considered in the first paper to propose an order-preserving scheme [1] , and was also studied in several works including [13] for the case of exact-match queries. We observe that the more restrictive functionality in this setting allows one to achieve IND-CCPA. We propose a new scheme that uses a monotone minimal perfect hash function (MMPHF) directly as an "order preserving tagging algorithm" for the given message set, together with a secure encryption. The construction allows for easy implementation of range queries while also achieving the strongest security. Moreover, while MMPHFs are known to require long keys [4] , recent constructions [4] are close to being space-optimal. Thus, this application of MMPHFs for tagging seems to be a novel, nearly efficientas-possible way to support range queries, leaking nothing but the order of ciphertexts, when the database is fixed in advance.
A new modular OPE scheme and its analysis. Finally, we propose a technique that improves on the security of any OPE scheme without sacrificing efficiency. Recall that our ROPF analysis reveals information leakage in OPE not alluded to by [8] , namely about the locations of the data points rather than just the distances between them. We suggest a modification to (that can be viewed as a generalization of) an OPE scheme that overcomes this. The resulting scheme is not order-preserving per se, but still permits range queries-in this case, modular range queries. (When the left end of the queried range is greater than the right end, a modular range query returns the "wrap-around range," i.e. everything greater than the left end or less than the right end.) The modification to the scheme is simple and generic: the encryption algorithm just adds (modulo the size of the message space) a secret offset to the message before encryption. (The secret offset is the same for all messages.) We call a scheme obtained this way a modular OPE scheme, and generalize the security notion: the ideal object is now a random modular OPF (RMOPF), i.e. a random OPF applied to messages with a randomly picked offset. It is easy to see that any secure OPE scheme yields a secure modular OPE scheme using the above transformation.
We show that a random modular OPF, unlike a random OPF, completely hides the locations of the data points (but has the same leakage with respect to distance and window-distance onewayness). On the other hand, if the adversary is able to recover a single known plaintext-ciphertext pair, security falls back to that of a random OPF.
We also note that the technique with a secret offset can be applied to the CEOE scheme to enhance its security even beyond IND-CCPA when support for modular range queries is sufficient.
Related work. Efficient (sub-linear time) search on encrypted data for the case of simple exactmatch queries has been addressed by [2] in the symmetric-key setting and [6, 10, 7] in the public-key setting. The work of [16] suggested enabling efficient range queries on encrypted data not by using OPE but so-called prefix-preserving encryption (PPE) [22, 5] . But as discussed in [16, 2] , PPE schemes are subject to certain attacks. Allowing range queries on encrypted data in the public-key setting was studied in [11, 20] , but the solutions are not suitable for large databases, requiring to scan the whole database on every query. As we mentioned, order preserving encryption as an efficient solution for range queries has been proposed in [1] , however, they do not provide any formal security analysis.
Preliminaries
Notation. If M is an integer, then [M ] denotes the set {1, . . . , M }. For a set S and n ≤ |S|, let Comb S n denote the set of n-element subsets of S. If Enc is an encryption function with key K, x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) is a vector, and X = {x 1 , . . . , x } is a set, then Enc(K, x) is shorthand for (Enc(K, x 1 ), . . . , Enc(K, x )) and Enc(K, X) is shorthand for {Enc(K, x 1 ), . . . , Enc(K, x )}. The same holds for decryption Dec.
If S is a finite set then x $ ← S denotes that x is selected uniformly at random from S. For convenience, for any k ∈ N we write x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k $ ← S as shorthand for the series of assignments
If A is a randomized algorithm and Coins is the set from where it draws its coins, then we write a $ ← A(x, y, . . .) as shorthand for R $ ← Coins ; a ← A(x, y, . . . ; R), where the latter denotes that variable a obtains the result of running A on inputs x, y, . . . and coins R.
We denote the probability of event A by Pr [ A ]. If A depends on a random variable X, we write Pr To model the intended application with encryption scheme (K, Enc, Dec): using a key K $ ← K, data is encrypted and stored on the server. For a standard range query, the user submits two unordered ciphertexts {c 1 , c 2 } to the server. Let (m 1 , m 2 ) = Dec(K, (c 1 , c 2 )). Then the target is (min{m 1 , m 2 }, max{m 1 , m 2 }), and the server must return the set of ciphertexts in the database whose decryptions fall into the associated range. Notice that these targets are always standard. In a modular range query, the user submits two ordered ciphertexts (c c R ) ). Then the range query target is (m L , m R ), and the server must return the set of ciphertexts in the database whose decryptions fall into the associated range. Notice that these targets can be standard or wrap-around.
Symmetric encryption. A symmetric encryption scheme SE = (K, Enc, Dec) with associated plaintext space D and ciphertext space R consists of three algorithms.
• The randomized key generation algorithm K returns a secret key K.
• The (possibly randomized) encryption algorithm Enc takes a secret key K and a plaintext m to return a ciphertext c.
• The deterministic decryption algorithm Dec takes a secret key K and a ciphertext c to return a plaintext m or a special symbol ⊥ indicating that the ciphertext was invalid.
We require the usual correctness condition, Dec(K, (Enc(K, m)) = m for all K output by K and all m ∈ D. Finally, we say that SE is deterministic if Enc is deterministic.
Order-preserving encryption (OPE). For
We say that deterministic encryption scheme SE = (K, Enc, Dec) with plaintext and ciphertext spaces D, R is an order-preserving encryption (OPE) scheme if Enc(K, ·) is an order-preserving function from D to R for all K output by K (with elements of D, R interpreted as numbers, encoded as strings).
Security of OPE.
We recall the security definition for OPE from [8] . Fix an order-preserving encryption scheme SE = (K, Enc, Dec) with plaintext space D and ciphertext space R, |D| ≤ |R|.
For an adversary A against SE, define its pseudorandom order-preserving function advantage under chosen-ciphertext attacks (POPF-CCA) advantage against SE as
where OPF D,R denotes the set of all order-preserving functions from D to R. We say SE is POPFsecure if this advantage is small. Informally, an OPE scheme is POPF-secure if oracle access to its encryption and decryption functions is indistinguishable from oracle access to a random order-preserving function (ROPF) on the same domain and range, and that function's inverse. In other words, any secure OPE scheme (including the only currently known blockcipher-based scheme from [8] ) should "closely" imitate the behavior of an ROPF. Accordingly we focus in this paper on analyzing the ideal object, an ROPF.
An "ideal" scheme, ROPF. We define the "ideal" ROPF scheme as follows. Let OPF D,R denote the set of all order-preserving functions from D to R. Define ROPF D,R = (K r , Enc r , Dec r ) as the following deterministic order-preserving encryption scheme:
• K r returns a random element g of OPF D,R .
• Enc r takes the key and a plaintext m to return g(m).
• Dec r takes the key and a ciphertext c to return g −1 (c).
It should be clear that ROPF D,R is optimally POPF-secure, by design. Of course, it is not computationally efficient, but this is fine as our goal is analyzing its security for the purpose of clarifying security of all POPF-secure constructions.
Most likely plaintext. Let SE D,R = (K, Enc, Dec) be a symmetric encryption scheme on domain D, range R. For given c ∈ R, if m c ∈ D is a message such that Pr
achieves a maximum at m = m c , then we call m c a (if unique, "the") most likely plaintext for c.
we call d c 1 ,c 2 a (if unique, "the") most likely plaintext distance from c 1 to c 2 .
New Security Definitions
As explained in the introduction, the "ideal" ROPF scheme defined in Section 2 itself requires a cryptographic treatment. Toward this end, we propose several generalized security definitions that help us understand its security.
Let SE [M ] ,[N ] = (K, Enc, Dec) be a deterministic symmetric encryption scheme.
Window one-wayness. The most basic question left unanswered by [8] is whether a POPF-secure scheme is even one-way. Towards this end we start with the one-wayness definition. Our definition is a stronger and more general version of the standard notion of one-wayness. For 1 ≤ r ≤ M and z ≥ 1, the adversary is given a set of z ciphertexts of (uniformly) random messages and is asked to come up with an interval of size r within which one of the underlying plaintexts lies. We call our notion r, z-window one-wayness (or r, z-WOW). Note that when r = 1, the definition collapses to the standard one-wayness definition (for multiple ciphertexts), and we will call it one-wayness for simplicity. The r, z-window one-wayness (r, z-WOW) advantage of an adversary A against
where the experiment Exp r,z-wow
(A) above is defined in Figure 1 . Notice that the latter success condition allows the adversary to specify a window that "wraps around" the message space. Granting this extra power to the adversary will be useful in analyzing the MOPE scheme of Section 5.2.
Window distance one-wayness. To identify the extent to which an OPE scheme leaks distance between plaintexts, we also provide a definition in which the adversary attempts to guess the interval of size r in which the distance between any two out of z random plaintexts lies, for 1 ≤ r ≤ M and z ≥ 2. We call the notion r, z-window distance one-wayness (r, z-WDOW). When r = 1, the adversary has to guess the exact distance between any two of z ciphertexts.
The r, z-window distance one-way (r, z-WDOW) advantage of adversary A against scheme where the experiment Exp r,z-wdow
(A) above is defined in Figure 2 . 
Experiment Exp
r,z-wdow SE [M ],[N ] (A) K $ ← K ; m $ ← Comb [M ] z ; c ← Enc(K, m) (d 1 , d 2 ) $ ← A(c) Return 1 if d 2 − d 1 + 1 ≤ r and there exist distinct m i , m j ∈ m with m j − m i mod M ∈ [d 1 , d 2 ] Return 0 otherwise
One-Wayness of a Random OPF
This section is devoted to analyzing the "ideal" scheme ROPF [M ] , [N ] under the security definitions given in the previous section. The first result shows an upper bound on 1, z-WOW advantage against the scheme. This demonstrates that on practical parameters, ROPF and POPF-secure OPEs significantly resist (size-1-window) one-wayness attacks. In contrast, the second result shows the ideal ROPF scheme is susceptible to an efficient large-window (a constant times √ M ) onewayness attack, by constructing an adversary and lower-bounding its r, z-WOW advantage.
The analysis then proceeds similarly for window distance one-wayness definitions: we will show analogous contrasting results for small-versus large-window experiments. We now turn to the details of the analysis.
Upper and lower bounds on window one-wayness
An upper bound on one-wayness advantage. The following theorem states an upper bound on the 1, z-WOW advantage of any adversary against ROPF [M ] , [N ] . [Note: the multiplicative constant in the bound has been improved from 9 in the proceedings version [9] 
The formal proof is quite involved and is relegated to Appendix A. The idea is to first bound 1, z-WOW security in terms of 1, 1-WOW security; because ciphertexts are correlated, a simple hybrid argument does not work and our reduction instead uses a combinatorial approach, demonstrating a bijection between objects in relevant definitions. Then, to bound 1, 1-WOW security, we again take a combinatorial strategy, as follows. We consider a ciphertext's most likely plaintext (m.l.p.) and recall the negative hypergeometric distribution (NHGD). We first relate the middle ciphertext's m.l.p.'s NHGD probability for a given plaintext/ciphertext space to that of a space twice the size; iterating this result produces a formula for the middle ciphertext's m.l.p.'s NHGD probability in a large space given the analogous value in a small space. We then relate any ciphertext's m.l.p.'s NHGD probability to that of the middle ciphertext in the space. Finally, we approximate the sum of m.l.p. NHGD probabilities over the ciphertext space in terms of that of the middle ciphertext, and hence to that of the middle ciphertext in a smaller space. Plugging in a value for the m.l.p. NHGD probability on the small space and simplifying yields the bound.
Evaluating the bound. The bound of Theorem 4.1 is quite succinct-it does not even rely on N (as long as N ≥ 2M ). The result in essence shows that as long as the challenge set size z is small compared to M , the bound is a small constant times z/ √ M . This in turn is small as long as z is small compared to √ M . Table 1 shows some sample evaluations of the bound for several message space and challenge set sizes. We see that ROPF [M ] , [N ] has very good one-wayness security for reasonably-sized parameters. Given the results of [8] our bound for ROPF can be easily adjusted for their POPF construction, by taking into account pseudorandomness of an underlying blockcipher. But as we discussed in the introduction, standard one-wayness may not be sufficient in all applications and we have to also analyze the schemes under other security notions. Thus, we turn to the next result.
A lower bound on large window one-wayness. Here we show that there exists a very efficient adversary attacking the window one-wayness of an ROPF for a sufficiently large window size. A more intuitive explanation of the result follows the theorem. 
The proof is in Appendix F. There, we construct a straightforward adversary and demonstrate that it has the above probability of success, using some bounds by Chvátal on the tail probabilities of the hypergeometric distribution. 
Upper and lower bounds on distance window one-wayness
An upper bound on distance one-wayness advantage. The following theorem, with the proof in Appendix G, states an upper bound on the 1, z-distance one-wayness of a random OPF that is very similar to the bound in Theorem 4.1. 
Naturally, as this result looks very much like that of Theorem 4.1, the proof follows the same strategy and achieves similar results. The only differences are that the initial reduction relates r, z-WDOW security to r, 2-WDOW security, incurring a factor z(z − 1) advantage increase as opposed to just z, and the initial (tight) bound formula replaces parameters N , M with N − 1, M − 1. See Appendix G for proof details.
Thus, the 1, z-window distance one-wayness of a random OPF is upper-bounded in a similar fashion as the 1, z-window one-wayness, and we conclude that random OPFs have good 1, z-WDOW security. Again, though, that is not the whole story, as we see next.
A lower bound on large window distance one-wayness. Here, we derive a result similar to that of Theorem 4.2, but for the window distance one-wayness of a random OPF. 
The proof appears in Appendix I. Intuitively, Theorem 4.4 implies that for r ≈ b √ M , where b is a large enough constant (say, b ≥ 8), there exists an efficient adversary A whose r-window distance one-wayness advantage is very close to 1. More precisely, let r = b
+ 1, and the theorem implies there exists an A such that
Further security considerations for ROPFs
In this section, we explore several important questions regarding our ROPF security analysis.
Effect of known-plaintext attacks. It is a natural question to ask what happens to the security of an ROPF scheme when the adversary knows a certain number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In general, we can answer this question for each definition of one-wayness using a simple extension of the arguments above.
In the scheme ROPF D,R , known plaintext-ciphertext pairs split the plaintext and ciphertext spaces into subspaces. On each subspace, the analysis under each one-wayness definition reduces to that of an ROPF on the domain and range of the subspace. For instance, if (m 1 , c 1 ) and (m 2 , c 2 ) are known for m 1 < m 2 , and no other known plaintext-ciphertext pairs occur between these two, then for D = {m ∈ D | m 1 < m < m 2 } and R = {c ∈ R | c 1 < c < c 2 }, we analyze the behavior of the function on this subspace by considering the one-wayness bounds on ROPF D ,R .
This brings up an important issue. For much of our analysis to apply to a scheme, it must be the case that the ciphertext space is at least twice the size of the message space. Therefore, in order to make sure that our analysis will still apply to most subspaces once several plaintext-ciphertext pairs are discovered by the adversary, we would like to choose the initial parameters in such a way that subspaces are unlikely to violate this condition.
Choosing the ciphertext space size. This brings us to the question posed in [8] : given a plaintext space of size M , what should be the size N of the ciphertext space? The recommendation and justification given in [8] was ad-hoc, necessarily so because the paper lacked a notion of security that would in any way depend on the size of N compared to M . Indeed, the choice of N has to do with the nature of the ideal object, an ROPF, while [8] was focused only on pseudorandomly sampling that ideal object, not analyzing it. Now that we have ways of characterizing the security of an ROPF using our one-wayness definitions, we can more justifiably discuss the question of what to choose for N .
For
The bounds found in the previous sections assume that N ≥ 2M . Thus, any non-shallow interval can be analyzed through our theorems about one-wayness, and as a result we would like to choose N to avoid shallow intervals, both in the original space and in potential subspaces.
In particular, consider the following result, which bounds the probability that an interval between encryptions of two random plaintexts is shallow. 
The proof can be found in Appendix K. Besides using Lemma F.1, the proof is mostly algebraic fiddling.
This bound gives us an idea of good values for t ≈ N/M . In particular, it seems that choosing a constant for t ≥ 7, that is, taking N to be a constant multiple of M , is sufficient in order to make the above probability negligible. Whether the constant should be large or small depends on one's tolerance for random intervals to be shallow.
On implementing a scheme to support range queries using POPF. We stress that most of our analysis relies on the uniformity assumption, namely that challenge messages come from a uniform distribution. Thus, practitioners relying on our one-wayness analysis should take steps to satisfy the uniformity assumption. In particular, underlying messages that are encrypted in a database, as well as queries, should "look" uniform in terms of their location in the message space. These uniformity restrictions could possibly be met by a scheme that performs "dummy" queries, in addition to legitimate queries, in order to make queries look uniformly random.
It is an open problem to extend our analysis to other input distributions other than uniform. However, it seems unlikely that anything positive can be said about OPE schemes' one-wayness for arbitrary distributions or for models where the adversary can choose challenge messages or distributions.
Achieving Stronger Security
We study new ways to achieve better security than the OPE scheme of [8] while still allowing for efficient range queries on encrypted data. But first, we define a general primitive, efficiently orderable encryption (EOE), that includes all schemes that support efficient standard range queries, including OPE. The security notion indistinguishability under ordered chosen-plaintext attack (IND-OCPA), defined and shown to be unachievable by OPE in [8] , is the ideal security definition for such schemes.
We define "committed" analogues of EOE and IND-OCPA, namely CEOE and IND-CCPA, that apply to the practical scenario where the database to encrypt is pre-determined and static. Such a setting has been studied in several works on searchable encryption, including the first paper to propose an order-preserving scheme [1, 13] . We then propose a new CEOE scheme that is CCPA-secure.
Finally, we develop a generic modification of an OPE that supports modular range queries (but not standard range queries) and overcomes some of the security weaknesses of any OPE that we studied in Section 4. The scheme is not EOE because it does not leak order; rather, it leaks only "modular" order.
Efficiently orderable encryption. We say that EOE = (K, Enc, Dec, W ) is an efficientlyorderable encryption (EOE) scheme if K, Enc, Dec are the algorithms of a symmetric encryption scheme, W is an efficient algorithm that takes two ciphertexts as input, and defining C K = {Enc(K, m) | m ∈ M} as the set of valid ciphertexts for key K,
for any key K and all c 0 , c 1 ∈ C K . It is easy to see that such a scheme permits efficient standard range queries, as the server can keep the encrypted database sorted using W .
It is also clear that any OPE scheme (K, Enc, Dec) corresponds to an EOE scheme with the same key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms, and W (c 0 , c 1 ) outputting 1, 0, or −1 if the relation between c 0 and c 1 is <, =, or >, respectively. But in general an EOE scheme does not have to be deterministic.
Committed efficiently-orderable encryption
Range queries on a predetermined static database. Now we consider schemes for the settings when it is possible for the user to preprocess the whole data before encrypting and sending it to the server. For that we allow the key generation of an EOE scheme to take the message set as input, which we rename a committed EOE scheme.
Committed efficiently-orderable encryption. A committed efficiently-orderable encryption (CEOE) scheme on domain D is a tuple (K, Enc, Dec, W ) satisfying the following.
• The randomized key generation algorithm K takes a message space M ⊂ D (called the committed message space) as input and outputs a secret key K.
• For any committed message space M ⊂ D, (K(M), Enc, Dec, W ) is an EOE scheme on M.
We will show that a CEOE scheme can achieve very strong security. In particular, it can achieve the "committed" adaptation of the IND-OCPA notion from [8] , where the adversary outputs two vectors of plaintexts with the same order and equality pattern and is asked to guess whether it is given encryptions of the first or second vector. We define indistinguishability under committed chosen plaintext attack (IND-CCPA) . The definition mimics IND-OCPA except that the adversary chooses the challenge vectors (now viewed as message spaces) before key generation, and the scheme's key generation algorithm takes the appropriate message space as input. denotes a state the adversary can preserve. We say that CEOE is IND-CCPA-secure if the IND-CCPA advantage of any adversary against CEOE is small.
Our CEOE construction and its security. We now propose a CEOE scheme that will achieve IND-CCPA security. A ciphertext in our scheme consists of a semantically-secure ciphertext of the message concatenated with the tag, which indicates the order of the message in the ordered message list. As a building block for our scheme we use monotone minimal perfect hash functions, defined as follows.
Let M be a set with a total (lexicographical) order. h is a monotone minimal perfect hash function [4] (MMPHF) on M if h sends the ith largest element of M to i, for i = 0, 1, . . . , |M| − 1.
Notice that the MMPHF on any given domain M is unique. So that we can use MMPHFs in the upcoming construction, let an index tagging scheme (K, τ ) be a pair of algorithms such that K takes a domain M and outputs a secret key K M so that τ (K M , ·) is the (unique) MMPHF for M, while τ (K, m) =⊥ for any m / ∈ M. Our CEOE construction is based on two building blocks: MMPHF tagging and any symmetric encryption scheme.
Construction 5.1. Let (K t , τ ) be an index tagging scheme. Let SE = (K , Enc , Dec ) be any symmetric encryption scheme on a fixed universe D. We construct a CEOE scheme CEOE = (K, Enc, Dec, W ) as follows.
• K takes M ⊂ D as input, runs K t ← K t (M) and K e ← K , and returns K = K t K e .
•
m).
• Dec takes key K = K t K e and ciphertext c = i c as input, and returns Dec (K e , c ).
We note that unlike the scheme with pre-processing for exact-match queries [13] , when using the above scheme the server does indexing and query processing as for unencrypted data, which is a practical advantage. Also, as the following result shows, the scheme is secure under IND-CCPA. Note that our secure CEOE construction relies on an efficient MMHPF implementation. Luckily, MMHPFs were studied recently by [4] . They showed that for a universe of size 2 w and for n ≥ log w, the shortest possible description of an MMPHF function (and thus, best possible key length for a tagging scheme) on n elements is unfortunately quite large at Ω(n) bits. This is somewhat disheartening, as a naive solution, in which the MMPHF key consists of an n-entry array whose ith entry is the ith largest element in the domain, has a key length of O(nw). Nevertheless, the authors of [4] were able to generate MMPHF descriptions that are closer to the optimal bound: one construction uses O(n log log w) bits and has query time O(log w), and the other uses O(n log w) bits and has constant query time. This is still large, but may be practical depending on the parameters involved.
Modular OPE and analysis of an ideal MOPE scheme
Modular OPE. We propose a modification to (that can be viewed as a generalization of) an OPE scheme that improves the security performance of any OPE. The resulting scheme is no longer strictly order-preserving, but it still permits range queries. However, now the queries must be modular range queries. Standard range queries are not supported, as only "modular order" rather than order is leaked. The modification from OPE is simple, generic, and basically free computation-wise.
Let (K, Enc, Dec) be an order-preserving encryption scheme. Define a modular order-preserving encryption scheme (MOPE) SE [M ] ,[N ] = (K m , Enc m , Dec m ) as follows.
• K m runs K to get K, picks j $ ← [M ] and returns (K, j).
• Enc m on input (K, j) and m returns Enc(K, m − j mod M ).
• Dec m on inputs (K, 
Note that all OPFs are MOPFs; on the other hand, most MOPFs are not OPFs. However, a MOPF g is "modular order-preserving" in that the function g − g(0) mod N is order-preserving. Now, define RMOPF [M ] ,[N ] = (K rm , Enc rm , Dec rm ), the random modular order-preserving function scheme, as the following (inefficient) encryption scheme:
• K rm returns a random instance g of MOPF [M ] [N ] .
• Enc rm takes the key g and a plaintext m to return g(m).
• Dec rm takes the key g and a ciphertext c to return g −1 (c).
Note that an MOPF could alternatively be defined with a random ciphertext shift following the OPF rather than a random plaintext shift preceding it. The advantage of the above definition is that the map from (OPF, ciphertext offset) pairs to MOPFs is bijective whereas in the alternative it is not one-to-one.
We now are ready to define MOPE security. Fix an MOPE scheme
Enc rm , Dec rm ) be as defined above. For an adversary A, define its pseudorandom modular order-preserving function (PMOPF) advantage against SE as
It is straightforward to show that the MOPE scheme obtained from any POPF-secure OPE scheme via the transformation defined in the beginning of Section 5.2 is PMOPF-secure, under the same assumption as the base scheme. We omit the details.
We now analyze the ideal object, RMOPF, under the one-wayness definitions.
Window one-wayness of RMOPF. The following proposition establishes that RMOPF is optimally r, z-window one-way (and hence optimally one-way, taking r = 1) in the sense that an adversary cannot do better than an adversary that outputs a random window independent of the challenge set. (Reminder: "window" includes windows that wrap around the edge of the space.)
Proposition 5.3. Fix any window size r and challenge set size z. Let A rand (r) be an r, z-WOW adversary that, on any input, outputs a random r-window from [M ]. Then for any adversary A,
Proof. Let V m be the set of r-windows in [M ] that contain an element of m. Notice that |V m | ≤ rz, as each element of the challenge set is contained in at most r windows. Also, the total number of r-windows in [M ] is M . An adversary wins if it outputs an element in V m . Since A rand outputs a random r-window, it is clear that Adv r,z-wow 
For each I, note that there are precisely n values for j ∈ [M ] for which I + j ∈ S, and precisely M − n for which I + j / ∈ S. Thus, over the choice of j, each interval I has the same probability of winning (namely, n/M .) Hence, a random choice of interval has the same probability of success as any other choice of interval. This is true for any function f and challenge set c, so the result follows.
As one might surmise, the above "optimal" characterization of the one-wayness of a random MOPF fails to show a complete picture of the information a random MOPF leaks. To investigate further, we turn to distance one-wayness.
WDOW Advantage Bounds for RMOPF. We claim that the distance one-wayness analysis for RMOPF is exactly the same as for ROPF. To see this, consider the following proposition. So, while an RMOPF has similar security to that of an ROPF for distance and window distance one-wayness, it is better in terms of one-wayness and window one-wayness. The analysis easily transfers to any secure MOPE scheme. We now discuss a few supplemental security considerations for RMOPF schemes. On implementing a scheme to support range queries using PMOPF. We note that when a pseudorandom MOPF scheme is used to implement a range-query-supporting database, even wrap-around target range queries must be made, for otherwise an adversary may infer the secret offset of the MOPF scheme after observing many non-wrap-around target queries.
Remark. We finally note that the tagging scheme CEOE defined in Section 5.1 could be similarly modified so that its tag receives a secret offset. The resulting scheme would support modular range queries in the predetermined static database scenario, and satisfy a stronger version of IND-CCPA, leaking only "modular" order.
Conclusions
We revisited security of symmetric order-preserving schemes defined in [8] . We formally clarified the strengths and limitations of any OPE scheme proven to be a pseudorandom order-preserving function (POPF), and in particular, the efficient OPE scheme proposed in [8] . Namely, for any POPF-secure OPE our analysis together with the result of [8] provides upper bounds on the advantages of any adversaries attacking the one-wayness and distance one-wayness, (2) lower bounds on the window one-wayness and window distance one-wayness advantages. We hope our results help practitioners to estimate the risks and security guarantees of using a secure OPE in their applications. Our analysis also gives directions in selecting the size of the ciphertext space. Finally we proposed a simple and efficient transformation that can be applied to any OPE scheme. Our analysis shows that the transformation yields a scheme with improved security in that the scheme resists the one-wayness and window one-wayness attacks.
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A Proving Theorem 4.1
Before proceeding, we define probabilities relating to the hypergeometric distribution, and note their connection to random OPFs, which was demonstrated in [8] . These probabilities will show up at several points in the analysis.
Let N ≥ M , 0 ≤ y ≤ N , 0 ≤ x ≤ M . Recall hypergeometric and negative hypergeometric probabilities
For convenience, define a third, related probability:
As shown in [8] , random OPFs are naturally linked to negative hypergeometric probabilities. We will use the fact that for (K r , Enc r , Dec r ) = ROPF [M ] . This reduction is achieved as the combination of two sub-reductions, going through an intermediate security notion, specified r, z-WOW security, that we define in the proof.
The second component result, Lemma A.2, states and proves a tight upper bound on the 1, 1-WOW advantage of an adversary against ROPF [M ] , [N ] . Note that the analysis is informationtheoretic; we do not assume any bound on the running-time of the adversary. Though the resulting bound is optimal, it is quite difficult to directly calculate for reasonably-sized parameters: the bound is essentially an average of "most likely plaintext (m.l.p.) negative hypergeometric distribution (NHGD) probabilities." In computing the bound, not only do we need to evaluate N many NHGD probabilities, but each probability must be computed for very large parameters. For instance, in our tests it took Mathematica about 90 seconds to directly compute the optimal bound for M = 2 10 , N = 2 18 , and each doubling of the spaces tended to increase the time needed by a factor of more than 4, so by extrapolation it may take years to compute the bound exactly for even M = 2 20 , N = 2 28 .
Thus, a simpler bound is needed. The third component result, Lemma A.3, provides this. It takes the expression of the previous lemma and, through numerous algebraic and analytical methods, loosens and simplifies the bound. Though the resulting bound is no longer tight, it is a much more useful and understandable result. (And in fact, it is not too far from being tight, as we discuss informally in Appendix E.) Essentially, Lemma A.3 gives a bound on the average of m.l.p. NHGD probabilities on arbitrarily large parameters that is a function of a single m.l.p. NHGD probability, α 0 , on small parameters. We achieve this result in several steps, as follows. (1) Relate the middle ciphertext's m.l.p. probability for a given plaintext/ciphertext space to that of a space twice the size, using an algebraic argument. (2) Iterate the previous result to find a formula for the middle ciphertext's m.l.p. probability in a large space given the analogous value α 0 in a small space. (3) For a fixed space, relate an arbitrary ciphertext's m.l.p. probability with that of the middle ciphertext. (4) Tie the results together, approximating the sum of m.l.p. probabilities over the ciphertext space in terms of that of the middle ciphertext, and hence to that of the middle ciphertext in a smaller space.
The final component result, Corollary A.4, is a simple extension of Lemma A.3, plugging in a value for the single small-parameter NHGD probability α 0 . This yields the final bound in Theorem 4.1. Now, we turn to the proof.
Main lemmas and proof. The proof relies on two lemmas and a corollary to a third lemma, as follows.
Lemma A.1. For window size r, challenge set size z, and any adversary A, there exists a OWadversary A such that
The proof is in Appendix B.
Lemma A.2. For any adversary A,
The proof is in Appendix C.
Lemma A.3. Let N 0 ≥ 2M 0 be (positive) multiples of 2 and let M = 2 q M 0 and N = 2 q N 0 for integer q ≥ 1.
The proof is in Appendix D.
Proof. Let M 0 = 16. Then N 0 ≥ 32, and we have
The result then follows from Lemma A.3. Now, we are ready to prove the main, general result.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
In the final step, N ≥ 2M and M ≥ 15 + z imply N − z + 1 ≥ 2(M − z + 1) ≥ 32.
B Proving Lemma A.1
We first introduce a concept related to r, z-WOW security called specified r, z-WOW security. The proof then proceeds in two steps. First, we construct an adversary A whose specified r, z-WOW An intermediate security definition. The specified r, z-window-one-wayness advantage of adversary A with respect to scheme SE D,R = (K, Enc, Dec) is
where the security experiment is as follows.
Experiment Exp
The only difference between this experiment and the standard r, z-WOW one is that here, the experiment demands that the adversary return an r-window containing the pre-image of the specified ciphertext c 0 ∈ c (rather than any ciphertext from c.)
Reducing r, z-WOW security to specified r, z-WOW security for any scheme. As our first step, we show that for any efficient r, z-WOW adversary against a general scheme SE, there exists an efficient specified r, z-WOW adversary A whose success probability is at least a factor of 1/z of that of A.
Lemma B.1. For any scheme SE D,R and r, z, and any r, z-WOW adversary A, there exists an equally efficient specified r, z-WOW adversary A such that
Since m 0 is random from m, independent of the rest of the experiment, we conclude that A wins the specified experiment at least 1/z of the times that A wins the standard experiment. The result follows.
Reducing specified r, z-WOW security to r, 1-WOW security for ROPFs. Now, fix scheme ROPF [M ] ,[N ] = (K r , Enc r , Dec r ) = and r, z. It is left to reduce the success probability of a specified r, z-adversary A against this scheme to that of an r, 1-WOW adversary against
We first introduce a number of notations that will be useful in the proof. Let z = z − 1. For orderable sets D, R, and H ⊂ R, let OPF D,R (H) denote {f ∈ OPF D,R | H ⊂ f (D)}, i.e., the set of OPFs from D to R with all elements of H in their range. Similarly, for a set U , n ≤ |U |, and H ⊂ U with |H| ≤ n, let Cmb U n [H] denote the set of n-element subsets of U that contain H. For set S with elements x 1 < x 2 < . . . x |S| , and
Finally, for equal-sized orderable sets S 1 , S 2 , let UniqueOPF(S 1 , S 2 ) be the unique OPF from S 1 to S 
Proof. The bijective functions and their inverses can be defined as follows:
Since all functions are well-defined, the bijections are clear. See Figure 4 for a visual depiction of elements associated through the bijections.
Before we show the final reduction, we state and prove a small lemma.
, and z ≥ 1. Then for any set c ∈ Comb
Proof. The probability that some c ⊆ [N ] is chosen as the encryptions of the elements of m is equal to the probability that Enc r (K, ·) sends some z plaintexts m ⊆ [M ] to c, times the probability that the appropriate m was picked from [M ] . The former probability is equal to the likelihood that c is a subset of a random M -element subset of N , or
The latter probability is 1/ M z . Hence, the desired probability is
Indices
[32]\c X β 4
UniqueOPF( [5] , Indices , there exists an efficient r, 1-WOW adversary A to scheme
Proof. Let A be an adversary in experiment Exp s-r,z-wow
(A). We construct a similarly efficient adversary A to experiment Exp r,1-wow
(A ) using A as follows.
Assume that c is a random ciphertext in [N −z ] (as it is in Exp r,1-wow Then we must show that the input (c, c) to A accurately mimics the experiment Exp s-r,z-wow
That is, it must be that c looks random from Comb 
when β f is chosen as the random OPF; and the converse is also true. Hence, A and A have the same advantage in their respective experiments.
We also note that A is efficient if A is efficient, as the extra steps of sampling an element of Comb We are now ready to prove the main lemma of this section.
Proof of Lemma A.1. For any r, z, and any efficient r, z-WOW adversary A, there exist efficient algorithms A , A such that
The result follows.
C Proving Lemma A.2
The proof uses two supporting lemmas. One has already been proved, as Lemma B.3 in the special case z = 1 establishes that the uniform choice of plaintext in the experiment ensures a uniformly distributed challenge ciphertext. The second lemma, stated next, allows us to calculate the most likely plaintext for a given ciphertext. In particular, if N = tM for some positive integer t, then m c is unique for each c and
Proof. For any m, c, the probability that Enc r (K, m) = c over random K ∈ K r is P N HGD (N, M, c, m). Thus, the result follows directly from Lemma C.1.
We are now ready to prove the lemma.
Proof of Lemma A.2. In the one-wayness experiment, notice that an adversary A is not allowed any oracle access, and in fact the only information A receives is the ciphertext c. Thus, given c, the adversary's best recourse is to output the most likely plaintext for c. By Lemma B. (N, M, c, m c ) .
Thus, in the one-wayness experiment, the probability that the (randomly determined) challenge ciphertext is the image of its most likely plaintext is the average of the above quantity for each value of c.
D Proving Lemma A.3
The proof proceeds in several steps. Here is an outline:
• Lemma D.1 relates the middle ciphertext's most likely plaintext's NHGD probability for a given plaintext/ciphertext space to that of a space twice the size, using an algebraic argument.
• Corollary D.2 iterates this result, producing a formula for the middle ciphertext's most likely plaintext's NHGD probability in a large space given the analogous value α 0 in a small space.
• Lemma D.3 and Lemma D.4 together relate any ciphertext's most likely plaintext's NHGD probability to that of the middle ciphertext in the space, using Stirling's approximation and certain bounds on the gamma function.
• Finally, the proof of Lemma A.3 ties these results together, approximating the sum of most likely plaintext NHGD probabilities over the ciphertext space in terms of that of the middle ciphertext, and hence to that of the middle ciphertext in a smaller space.
For readability, we introduce the following notation. For a, b, t positive integers such that a > b and t < a/b, let 
In particular, 1 √ 2
Define the above quantity to be α. Also, let
and notice that for large M and N , β α β .
On the other hand,
Hence,
Now, we can easily approximate most likely NHGD probabilities for middle ciphertexts in large spaces, in the following manner. 
Proof. The left side of the statement directly follows from repeated application of Lemma D.1. Similarly, by the lemma,
Relating general most likely NHGD probabilities to that of the middle ciphertext.
In this section we show how to approximate most likely NHGD probabilities for any ciphertext in a large space using the probability corresponding to the middle ciphertext. Recall the definition of the gamma function: for x a real number,
The gamma function satisfies the following properties, for x real.
Γ(x + 1) = xΓ(x) ; Γ(1) = 1 .
For notational convenience, we will letΓ(x) = Γ(x + 1). The above properties imply thatΓ(x) is an extension of the factorial function to real numbers. In particular, for positive integer n,
Also, Stirling's approximation applies to Γ: for real x > 0,
.
We first prove a short lemma that will be used in the next proof.
Lemma D.3. Let M, N be multiples of 2 and N ≥ 2M . Let k ∈ (0, 1). For ease of notation, let
Proof. Using Stirling's approximation,
where 
Proof. We use the following bounds of D. Kershaw [15] : for x > 0 and 0 < s < 1,
Rewriting the bounds, for y > 1 and 0 < δ < 1, we have
For ease of notation, let k = 1 − k, M = N − M , and = kM − kM . By Lemma C.2, m kN = kM = kM + . Then using Lemma D.3,
where g( , k, M ) = 1 + . Notice that the bounds on k imply M k ≥ 1 and Therefore,
As a side note, the maximum value of f ( ) for ∈ [0, 1] in the above proof is slightly lower than 2. Mathematica finds a bound of approximately 1.927: Also, one could try to bound the value of g( , k, M ) in the proof (which is more difficult to do computationally) to achieve a tighter bound; empirical evidence shows it can be made very close to 1. Mathematica can handle this if we place some lower bound on M . For instance, forcing M > 1000000: We are content, however, to proceed with the looser upper bound of 2. The preceding results can now be put together to prove the main lemma statement. 
E Comparing tight and simple bounds
In Table 2 , we compare the tight bound of Lemma A.2 and the simple bound of Lemma A.3 for several values of M and N and see that the results are close. We have separated the constant factor 2 in each simple bound to illustrate how close the bounds would be if the factor 2 were improved to 1 (as described after the proof of Lemma D.4.) Proof. We will use a bound by Chvátal [12] on the upper tail of the hypergeometric distribution:
Chvátal's upper tail bound implies a similar lower tail bound: We now prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. As already mentioned, the first inequality of the theorem is trivially true.
It is left to prove the second inequality. Consider the following r, 1-WOW adversary A. where the inequality follows from Lemma F.1. Since A only performs efficient operations, the result follows.
G Proving Theorem 4.3
The proof of the theorem parallels that of Theorem 4.1. As such, it requires several intermediate results that are now stated.
Lemma G.1. For window size r, challenge set size z, and any adversary A, there exists a OWadversary A such that The proof is in Appendix J.
Notice that the bound in Lemma G.2 is precisely the bound in Lemma A.2, only with parameters M − 1, N − 1 instead of M , N . Thus, we will be able to use the simple bound from Corollary A.4.
The proof of the theorem now easily follows.
Proof of Lemma G.1. For any r, z, and any efficient r, z-WDOW adversary A, there exist efficient algorithms A , A such that The result follows.
I Proof of Theorem 4.4
Proof of Theorem 4.4. As in Theorem 4.2, the first inequality is trivially true. It is left to prove the second inequality, which we do by constructing an r, 2-WDOW adversary A as follows. is the most likely plaintext distance between c 1 and c 2 by Corollary J.2. The probability that the adversary succeeds in the r, 2-WDOW experiment is the probability that 
J Proving Lemma G.2
A formula for the most likely plaintext distance. In Corollary J.2 below, we derive a formula for the most likely plaintext distance between two given ciphertexts. But first, the following lemma determines the probability that a given ciphertext pair corresponds to a given plaintext distance, which is used to prove the corollary. Proof. In the following, we consider addition and subtraction of ciphertexts to be taken mod N . We are now ready to prove the lemma.
Proof of Lemma G.2. In the DOW experiment, since the adversary A is given only the challenge ciphertexts c 1 , c 2 , the adversary will have highest probability to win the game if it outputs the most likely plaintext distance for c 1 , c 2 . By Lemma J. 
